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DOES LEGALZOOM HAVE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS?
SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
CATHERINE J. LANCTOT ∗
INTRODUCTION
Historians may look back on the first decade of the twenty‐first century as
a watershed moment for the American legal profession. The explosive growth
of huge law firms at the turn of the century is now being countered by what
some fear may be a precipitous decline, tied in many ways to the plummeting
economic fortunes of their large corporate clients. 1 At the other end of the
spectrum of legal services, rapid technological developments have created a
host of online options for consumers of basic legal services, including
document preparation services. 2 As the legal profession struggles to reinvent
itself, job prospects for law school graduates are at their lowest ebb in
generations. 3 It seems that even a law degree is not recession proof.
In the past, one weapon that the organized bar has used to protect itself
during economic hard times is the principle of unauthorized practice of law—
guarding its market for legal services against the barbarians at the gate. 4
Although pursuing lay people for intruding into the business of lawyers is an
ongoing regulatory tactic, studies have shown that such enforcement actions
inspire particular devotion during times when business is scarce for licensed
lawyers. 5 It would not be surprising, then, to anticipate that charges of

∗

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Villanova Law School. J.D. 1981,
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1. See Nathan Koppel, Bar Raised for LawGrad Jobs, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2010, http://online.ws
j.com/article/SB10001424052748704866204575224350917718446.html (“[L]aw firms, judges,
the government and other employers have drastically cut hiring in the economic downturn. Large
corporate law firms have been hit particularly hard. The nation’s 100 highest‐grossing corporate
firms last year reported an average revenue decline of 3.4%, the first overall drop in more than 20
years.”)
2. Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document Preparation and the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 815 (2002); see also Chris Johnson,
Leveraging Technology to Deliver Legal Services, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 259 (2009) (providing a
recent overview of the business model for these services).
3. See Katy Hopkins, Law Jobs Will Be Harder to Come By, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 25,
2010, http://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2010/06/25/law‐jobs‐will‐be‐harder‐to‐com
e‐by (describing drastic cuts in summer and post‐graduate opportunities with questionable
prospects for growth in the near future).
4
For a comprehensive look at this history, see Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional
Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN.
L. REV 1 (1981).
5. See Debra Baker, Is This Woman a Threat to Lawyers?: A Resurgence in Unauthorized
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unauthorized practice of law will be pressed with renewed vigor in coming
days.
Before the legal profession turns its attention yet again to stamping out
the unauthorized practice of law, it is essential to consider the broader
ramifications of such a crusade. Charging lay people with practicing law
without a license has many inherent pitfalls. The first, which I have discussed
at length in the past, is that lawyers are incapable of defining just what is
meant by “the practice of law.” 6 The second, which is a little‐explored corollary
of the first, is that the lack of consensus on what constitutes the practice of law
may generate constitutional issues. 7 In particular, attempting to enforce a
broad and amorphous definition of “unauthorized practice” carries with it the
risk of a successful First Amendment challenge. 8
The collision of two equally muddled doctrines—unauthorized practice
on the one hand, and the First Amendment on the other—may itself be
responsible for the dearth of systematic examinations of this issue. Indeed,
lawyers may respond with reflexive disdain to the notion that anyone has a
First Amendment right to practice law. But it is a mistake to give short shrift to
this question, because some of the activities that might trigger unauthorized
practice claims today have a substantial speech component. In several well‐
known instances, lay people have defended against claims of unauthorized
practice by asserting that the law‐related activities they wanted to pursue
were protected by the First Amendment. 9 After all, the law is a “speaking
profession,” and the speech/conduct distinction that First Amendment
jurisprudence has attempted to identify can be difficult to discern. 10 Moreover,
the targets of recent unauthorized practice claims are no longer simply lay
individuals, but today may be large companies doing millions of dollars of
business. 11 These companies are likely to leave no stone unturned in
defending their livelihood against what they characterize as nothing more
than economic protectionism by an elite profession.
In this Article, I describe the activities of the most successful online
Practice Complaints is Raising Questions about Whether the Court of Public Opinion Will Judge
Lawyers as Guardians of the Common Good or Protectors of Their Own Turf, 85 A.B.A. J., 54, 56 (June
1999) (attributing an increase in unauthorized practice of law cases to a perceived growth in legal
services market competition from traditionally non‐legal businesses).
6. See Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 849‐50 (discussing the different
varieties of legal services offered to lay people and whether they may constitute unauthorized law
practice).
7. See id. at 852 (discussing potential First Amendment challenges to enforcement of
“unauthorized practice of law” statutes).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., id. at 826, 836 (reviewing N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y.
1967), and Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813
(N.D. Tex. Jan 22, 1999), vacated, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999)).
See generally Eugene Volokh, SPEECH AS CONDUCT: GENERALLY APPLICABLE
10.
LAWS, ILLEGAL COURSES OF CONDUCT, "SITUATION-ALTERING UTTERANCES," AND
THE UNCHARTED ZONES, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1277 (2005).
11. See Business Formations, http://www.legalzoom.com/business‐formations/business‐form
ations.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (outlining the company’s business services).
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document preparer, LegalZoom, and the mounting campaign against it from
the organized bar and disgruntled consumers. I then briefly sketch some
potential problems with the reflexive assumption that LegalZoom and its
fellow travelers are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Even
assuming that the practice of preparing routine legal documents for
consumers runs afoul of many unauthorized practice statutes, however, there
remains an open question of whether these statutes may themselves interfere
with First Amendment guarantees. In particular, to the extent that these
statutes broadly sweep vast amounts of law‐related speech within their scope,
they may infringe on free speech rights. Below, I lay out some of the possible
First Amendment arguments available to document preparers, without
extensive elaboration, to call attention to the possibility that they may be
raised in defense to an unauthorized practice prosecution. I conclude this
Article by sounding a caution about aggressive pursuit of these online
document preparers without careful consideration of the possible risks
involved. A successful First Amendment challenge to an unauthorized practice
statute could have repercussions far beyond the world of LegalZoom.
I.

LEGALZOOM AND ITS CHALLENGE TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION

The best illustration of the emerging dilemma is the online document
preparation service known as LegalZoom. Founded in 2001 by two former big
firm associates in Hollywood, California, LegalZoom has been extraordinarily
successful over the last decade and currently boasts “over 1,000,000 satisfied
customers” and roughly 400 employees. 12 LegalZoom offers the creation of
basic legal documents such as incorporation papers, simple wills, uncontested
divorces, and trademark registration. 13 Using an online questionnaire,
customers can build “an effective legal document” step‐by‐step, generally in
under fifteen minutes. 14 Co‐founder Robert Shapiro, a California attorney best
known for his role on the O.J. Simpson defense team, is touted as one of the
“top attorneys” behind the development of the site. 15 Under its business
model, a customer who wants a simple will can choose either the “Standard,”
“Gold,” or “Premium” service. 16 All packages include the “LegalZoom Peace of
Mind Review,” which not only includes “hundreds of automated checks,” but
also careful review by “document specialists” for grammar, spelling, and
completeness of information. 17
12. Lawsuits Challenge LegalZoom Document Business, L.A. DAILY NEWS, June 20, 2010, http://w
ww.losangelesdailynews.org/lawsuits‐challenge‐legalzoom‐document‐business/;
Nonprofits
Overview, http://www.legalzoom.com/non‐profits/non‐profit‐corporation‐overview.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2011).
13. LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
14. Id.
15. Management Team, http://www.legalzoom.com/about‐us/management‐team#2680 (last
visited Mar. 18, 2011).
16. Last Will Package Details, http://www.legalzoom.com/legal‐wills/wills‐packages.html
(last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
17. Id.; Peace of Mind Review, http://www.legalzoom.com/peace‐of‐mind‐popup.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2011).

Season 200N]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

104

Many companies tried to develop a similar business model at the turn of
the twentieth century, but most of them did not succeed. 18 One of the most
noted entrants into the pool of legal document preparation was the highly‐
touted franchise We The People, which also offered legal document
preparation, but in a bricks‐and‐mortar setting. 19 We The People was one of
the earliest do‐it‐yourself bankruptcy form preparation companies. The
company went national with a great publicity splash in 2003, when it entered
into a “strategic alliance” with former New York City mayor Rudolph Guiliani’s
consulting firm. 20 At its pinnacle, We The People boasted more than 1000
franchises in thirty states. 21 But the franchise became enmeshed in litigation in
multiple states over allegations that it was engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law by providing bankruptcy services. 22 Ultimately, the company
entered into settlement agreements with the United States Trustee in several
states to stop assisting customers with bankruptcy forms. 23 In February 2010,
We The People filed for bankruptcy in Delaware, having experienced a loss of
$2.5 million in 2009, with revenues of $1.4 million. 24
Similarly controversial since its inception, in recent years LegalZoom has
been the target of multiple unauthorized practice challenges. The Authorized
Practice Committee of the North Carolina State Bar investigated LegalZoom’s
practices and sent the company a cease‐and‐desist letter on May 5, 2008. 25
The Committee expressly rejected LegalZoom’s contention that it was not
offering any legal advice, explaining: “Legal advice includes the selection of
terms and clauses within a legal document as well as the selection of which

18. See Kenneth L. Carson, Legalize It? Lawyers Practicing Across State Lines, 46 BOS. B.J. 18, 20
(2002) (providing early, and sometimes extravagant, predictions of success for such companies).
19. WE THE PEOPLE, http://www.wethepeopleusa.com/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
20. Giuliani Partners and We The People Form Strategic Alliance, BUSINESS WIRE, Sept. 29, 2003,
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20030929005127/en/Giuliani‐Partners‐PeopleFor
m‐Strategic%20‐Alliance; Melinda Ligos, Moving In on New York Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/15/business/private‐sector‐moving‐in‐on‐new‐york‐lawyers
.html; Julie Sloane, First Kill The Lawyers . . . On the Price for Basic Legal Paperwork,
CNNMONEY.COM, April 1, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_archive/2004/04/01/3
66651/index.htm. Guiliani Partners severed its relationship with the company soon after it sold
out to Dollar Financial in the wake of multiple expensive settlements with bankruptcy trustees.
Nathan Vardi, The Company He Keeps, FORBES, Nov. 13, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/200
6/1113/138_2.html.
21. Richard Acello, We the Pauper, ABA J., May 1, 2010, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine
/article/we_the_pauper/.
22. Id.
23. See Sloane, supra note 20 (“The concept [of online legal document preparation services]
has proved controversial among—guess who?—lawyers, who have filed complaints against We
the People in 13 states. So far the company has settled most of those actions and remains in every
state in which it has set up shop. . . . Bankruptcy lawyers have been particularly vocal, and
complaints in seven states focus specifically on We the People’s bankruptcy services.”); see also
Ligos, supra note 20 (noting that We the People “has been the target of 29 lawsuits by lawyers,
state bar associations and other critics”).
24. Acello, supra note 21.
25. See N.C. State Bar Authorized Practice Comm., Letter of Caution Cease and Desist Re:
Allegation of Unauthorized Practice of Law, File No. 07AP0011, LEGAL ZOOM (May 5, 2008), http://
www.directlaw.com/LegalZoom%2020080326%20LOC.pdf.
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template to use.” 26 When one prepares a legal document for another, he
necessarily gives legal advice; although the customer chooses the type of legal
document from those available through LegalZoom, LegalZoom ultimately
controls the content. 27 “Regardless,” stated the Committee, “the North Carolina
statutes do not permit legal document preparation services even if they are
not accompanied by ‘legal’ advice.” 28 The Committee further refused to liken
LegalZoom’s services to those of a scrivener, noting that its document
preparation requires automated software. 29 This software was “designed in
accordance with the judgment of LegalZoom,” and therefore its operation
equates to the practice of law. 30
On December 12, 2008, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Board on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law issued its Advisory Opinion UPL 2008‐03, in
which it took the same position as the North Carolina State Bar Authorized
Practice Commission. 31 The Committee argued that there was a significant
difference between the conduct of online document preparers and the
“traditional and permissible activities of a scrivener,” explaining that the
“clerical act of filling out a form legal document is not the practice of law if it
consists of typing or writing verbatim the information provided by a customer
into the blanks of a form selected by the customer.” 32 The activity of the
scrivener “does not require the application of legal knowledge or legal skill
possessed by attorneys.” 33 An online service, in contrast, utilizes user
responses to a question set in order to select the proper clauses, provisions,
terms and forms that are required to accomplish the desired result. 34 This
process intrinsically requires the practice of law through the automated
decision‐making system. 35
Connecticut Bar Opinion 2008‐01 similarly denounced LegalZoom’s
activities. “Their conduct goes well beyond mere stenographic completion of
documents provided by a customer,” explained the Opinion. 36 Like its
counterpart in Ohio, the Connecticut Bar Association Committee on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) highlighted the fact that these types of
services utilize both “legal research and legal experience” to prepare the
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Legal Document Preparation by Online Services, Advisory Opinion UPL 2008‐03 (Bd. on
the Unauthorized Practice of Law of the S. Ct. of Ohio Dec. 12, 2008), available at http://www.sc
onet.state.oh.us/Boards/UPL/advisory_opinions/UPLAdvOp_08_03.pdf.
32. Id. at 1.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 3 (“The service . . . select[s] the appropriate legal form or the most appropriate
provisions/clauses for a legal form based on a consumer’s answers to online questions.”).
35. See id. (“This conduct constitutes the practice of law because legal advice is inherently
given when one selects and prepares the appropriate legal document for another, or selects
relevant terms, clauses, averments or other provisions for a form legal document or pleading,
based on responses to specific questions.”).
36. We The People and LegalZoom Document Preparation Services, Informal Opinion 2008‐01
at 3, Conn. Bar Assoc. Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (2008).
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appropriate documents so as to serve the needs of a given customer. 37 This
opinion also characterized the presence of “[s]upervising attorneys [and]
experts” as cost‐based evidence that legal advice is still being administered
during the document preparation process. 38
Yet another bar opinion followed the same approach in March 2010,
when the UPL Committee of the Pennsylvania Bar Association issued Formal
Opinion 2010‐01. 39 Following closely on the analysis of the other bar opinions
to have addressed the issue, the Committee asserted that the documents
prepared by such services are “legal documents including pleadings,
agreements, wills, trusts, etc., which . . . require the abstract understanding of
legal principles with a refined skill in their concrete application, i.e., the
exercise of legal judgment.” 40 The Committee argued that the exercise of legal
judgment occurred “not only in selection of the appropriate legal ‘form’ but
also in applying the facts of a particular ‘client’s’ [customer’s] unique
circumstances.” 41 Although the Committee acknowledged that “anyone may
sell ‘forms’ or provide solely clerical assistance in completing them, it is clear
from the advertising and the fees being charged by LDPS that [they] are
offering more than rote forms to be typed upon by a clerk.” 42
Two groups of disaffected LegalZoom customers have recently filed suit.
On December 18, 2009, a class action complaint was filed in Jefferson City,
Missouri in the case of Janson v. LegalZoom, 43 alleging that the online company
was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of a Missouri
statute. 44 LegalZoom removed the case to federal district court on February 5,
2010, contending that the amount in controversy in terms of potential refunds
sought was in excess of $5 million, 45 and the district court certified the case as
a class action in December 2010. 46 Katherine Webster, who asserted that she
had to hire a lawyer in order to remedy the problems with a living will she
purchased through LegalZoom, filed a similar lawsuit in Los Angeles Superior
Court on May 27, 2010. 47 General Counsel Chas Rampenthal asserted that the
company’s success had made it a ripe target for litigation. “I’m not certain why
all these lawsuits have been brought in this time frame, but I would have to
say the company is (increasingly) a recognized name brand when it comes to

37. Id. at 3.
38. See id. (“[The] involvement [of legal staff] would be an unnecessary expense to any steno‐
graphic activity. The involvement adds value only if they are giving legal advice.”).
39. Legal Document Preparation by Online and In‐Person Services, Formal Opinion 2010‐01
(Penn. Bar Assoc. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. Mar. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.pabar.org/public/committees/unautpra/Opinions/2010‐01LglDocumentPreparatio
n.pdf.
40. Id. at 5‐6.
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id.
43. Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 506, 506 (W.D. Mo. 2010).
44. Id.
45. See Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 782, 784 (W.D. Mo. 2010) (noting that
LegalZoom removed the case to the District Court).
46. Janson, 271 F.R.D. at 513.
47. Webster v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. BC438637 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed May 27, 2010).
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delivery of legal services by a nonlawyer, and that could be a factor.” 48
Most recently, the Washington state Attorney General negotiated a
settlement agreement with LegalZoom in September 2010, requiring the
company to stop comparing its services to those of licensed attorneys, and to
refrain from providing Washington consumers with individualized legal advice
concerning a self‐help form. 49
Other lawsuits may be on the horizon. A lawsuit brought against LegalZoom
in Alabama state court was voluntarily dismissed on January 21, 2011, but the
plaintiff's attorney indicated that he intended to have the suit brought by another
party, either by a district attorney or by a bar association. "There's no dispute that
LegalZoom does what we allege they do," he asserted. In response, Chas
Rampenthal claimed that the dismissal was a victory for LegalZoom, insisting: "It's
an access to justice issue. The decision shows that this attorney's attempt to block
the right of Alabama residents to use legal software and self-help websites should
never have begun. We view the decision to dismiss the case as an important legal
victory for LegalZoom and the public as a whole. After multiple court rejections of
his arguments, Mr. Dodd finally understood that his case had no merit and decided
to dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety." 50
II. IS LEGALZOOM ENGAGED IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW?
Despite the views of many bar regulators, the question of whether
preparation of legal documents by LegalZoom and similar companies
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law is far from settled. Critical to that
determination is resolving whether these companies provide “legal advice” in
the process of preparing these documents. 51 Legal document preparers
generally assert that they act as nothing more than scriveners, simply entering
data provided by their customers into designated forms. 52 Bar regulators and
disappointed clients insist that the act of determining how to use raw
information, including the selection of the proper form, is legal advice, and
thus the unauthorized practice of law. 53
A significant part of the problem is the legal profession’s notorious
inability to produce a principled definition of the practice of law. I have

48. Alfred Lee, Firm’s Paper Trail Targeted, L.A. BUS. J., June 14, 2010, http://www.labusinessjo
urnal.com/news/2010/jun/14/firms‐paper‐trail‐targeted/.
49. Debra Cassens Weiss, Wash. AG’s Settlement with LegalZoom Bars Fee Comparisons Absent
Disclosure, A.B.A. J., Sep. 21, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/wash._ags_settleme
nt_with_legalzoom_bars_fee_comparisons_absent_disclosure/.
50
See "Alabama Suit Against Legal Zoom Dismissed,
ttp://blog.al.com/businessnews/2011/02/alabama_suit_against_legalzoom.html; see also
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/01/idUS170730+01-Feb-2011+GNW20110201
51. See Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 849 (“The first question to consider
about sites like . . . LegalZoom is whether the services they provide could be said to constitute the
practice of law . . . .”).
52. Id. at 849‐50.
53. Id. at 849 (“[S]electing which form to use, giving advice about which information ought to
be included in a form, or soliciting information from a lay person and then making determinations
about how to use the information in the form is the equivalent of practicing law.”).
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previously examined this issue at some length, 54 but it merits additional
consideration today. As early as 1969, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly noted the difficulty of giving a comprehensive
definition of the practice of law, providing the following explanation:
the practice of law relates to the rendition of services for
others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. The
essence of the [lawyer’s] professional judgment . . . is his
educated ability to relate the general body and philosophy of
law to a specific legal problem of a client . . . . 55
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct did not even attempt this much of a
definition, stating what could charitably be described as obvious: “The
definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one
jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to
members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by
unqualified persons.” 56
In the Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, the American
Law Institute similarly proved incapable of developing a working definition of
“the practice of law.” As finalized in 2000, the Restatement does not offer a
definition, and the Reporter’s Note simply acknowledges that despite courts’
occasional attempts to “define unauthorized practice by general formulations,”
none of these attempts “seems adequately to describe the line between
permissible and impermissible nonlawyer services, such as a definition based
on application of difficult areas of the law to specific situations.” 57 It added:
“[m]any courts refuse to propound comprehensive definitions, preferring to
deal with situations on their individual facts.” 58
It should not be surprising, then, that the most elaborate attempt in
recent years to provide a more workable definition for the practice of law also
ended in failure. In mid‐2002, the Board of Governors of the American Bar
Association (ABA) established a Task Force on the Model Definition of the
Practice of Law. ABA President Alfred P. Carleton issued a “Challenge
Statement” explaining the purpose for the Task Force, noting that increasingly,
“nonlawyers are providing services that are difficult to categorize under
current statutes and case law as being . . . the delivery of legal services.” 59 The
uncertainty surrounding the definition of the practice of law may be
responsible, in part, “for the spotty enforcement of unauthorized practice of

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 811‐12.
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3‐5 (1982).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. (2001).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4: UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE BY A
NONLAWYER reporter’s note cmt. c (2000).
58. Id.
59. Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law Challenge Statement, AM. BAR
ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/task_force_model_definit
ion_practice_law/model_definition_challenge.html (last visited April 7, 2011).
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law statutes.” 60 Some jurisdictions have recently “taken steps to codify a
definition of the practice of law so as to attack” an increasing number of
problems related to the providing of legal services by nonlawyers. 61 Carleton
added that “given the Association’s leadership role in this area, it is
appropriate for it to consider anew the need to present a model definition to
address on a national stage these issues and to aid other jurisdictions that may
wish to take action.” 62
In response to this call for action, the draft definition used by the Task
Force, dated September 18, 2002, provided:
A person is presumed to be practicing law when engaging in any
of the following conduct on behalf of another: (1) Giving advice
or counsel to persons as to their legal rights or responsibilities or
to those of others; (2) Selecting, drafting, or completing legal
documents or agreements that affect the legal rights of a person;
(3) Representing a person before an adjudicative body,
including, but not limited to, preparing or filing documents or
conducting discovery; or (4) Negotiating legal rights or
responsibilities on behalf of a person. 63

The Task Force devoted nearly a year to study, hearings, and comment from a host
of interested parties. 64 Objections came from lawyers and nonlawyers alike,
including a forceful objection from the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission that the proposed rule would inhibit economic competition
and hurt consumers. 65
Despite its extensive effort, the ABA could not find its way through the
thicket of issues surrounding the definition of the practice of law. It simply
abandoned its draft definition, on the putative theory that “the necessary
balancing test for determining who should be permitted to provide services
that are included within the definition of the practice of law is best done at the
state level.” 66 While admitting that a definition of the practice of law is “an
important step in protecting the public from unqualified service providers,
eliminating uncertainty for persons working in law‐related areas about the
propriety of their conduct and enhancing the availability of services that are

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. These jurisdictions include Washington, Arizona, and the District of Columbia. Id.
Id.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2002), as reprinted in John Gibeaut, Another Try: ABA Task
Force Takes a Shot at Defining the Practice of Law, 88 A.B.A.J. 18, 19 (Dec. 2002) [hereinafter ABA
Task Force Report].
64. For an overview of the work of the Task Force, see Anthony J. Luppino, Multidisciplinary
Business Planning Firms: Expanding the Regulatory Tent Without Creating a Circus, 35 SETON HALL L.
REV. 109, 130‐41 (2004).
65. Comments on the American Bar Association’s Proposed Model Definition of the Practice of
Law (Dec. 20, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/lettertoaba.shtm.
66. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, GUIDELINES FOR
THE ADOPTION OF A DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, 2 (2003).

Season 200N]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

110

included within the definition of the practice of law,” the Task Force could not
agree on what that definition should be. 67 It cautioned that the “potential for
harm is too quickly discounted by those who want to expand the field of who
may provide services within the definition of the practice of law and too easily
found by those who want to restrict the practice of law to lawyers.” 68 The best
that it could do was to urge the overarching premise that “the practice of law is
the application of legal principles and judgment to the circumstances or
objectives of another person or entity.” 69 It concluded:
The process of balancing harm and benefit is not an easy one.
There is no simple formula. It requires an exercise of discretion
and judgment based on the best available evidence. Each
jurisdiction should weigh concerns for public protection and
consumer safety, access to justice, preservation of individual
choice, judicial economy, maintenance of professional
standards, efficient operation of the marketplace, costs of
regulation and implementation of public policy. 70

The ABA Task Force Report ultimately took the unhelpful position that
jurisdictions should apply “common sense” in defining the practice of law. 71
This abdication of responsibility to define the practice of law by the
largest organization of lawyers in America sheds considerable light on the
complexity of the issue. On the one hand, the profession takes the position that
the practice of law is not susceptible to definition, and on the other hand, the
profession wants the authority to punish nonlawyers who engage in this
undefined practice of law. Trying to have it both ways produces the
definitional dilemma, and I have previously cautioned that “[r]esting a
fundamental regulatory principle of the legal profession on such a formless
concept creates its own set of problems when lawyers seek to prevent lay
people from encroaching on their professional territory.” 72
With that said, it is certainly true that the activities of online document
preparers pose serious questions under any traditional definition of “practice
of law.” Generally, state bar associations and courts have drawn a distinction
between giving generic legal information and giving personalized legal advice.
For purposes of determining whether an attorney has created a professional
relationship with a potential client, for example, as long as the communication
was simply “information” rather than advice tailored to the particular

67. Id. at 1.
68. Id.
69. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 63. In its original draft, issued by the ABA Task
Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law on September 18, 2002, the "practice of law"
was defined as “the application of legal principles and judgment with regard to the circumstances
or objectives of a person that require the knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law.”
(emphasis added).
70. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 63, at 6. The report then considers, in detail, particular
factors to be considered.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 812‐13.
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circumstances of that potential client, there is no attorney‐client
relationship. 73 Similarly, unauthorized practice prosecutions often have
focused on whether the service provided by the lay practitioner was tailored
or customized to a set of individualized facts. 74 Online document preparers
like LegalZoom seem to provide services that include both the selection of
legal forms for consumers based upon information they provide, and the
determination of how to insert specific consumer information into the blank
forms. As I have argued in the past, to the extent that this process resembles
the application of general legal principles to a specific set of facts, it might
qualify as “legal advice.” 75
The line between “legal information” and “legal advice” remains murky
under unauthorized practice of law principles. But what are the implications of
this ill‐defined concept under the First Amendment? In particular, does the
First Amendment protect at least some aspects of nonlawyer speech about the
law? The answer to this question suggests the possibility that LegalZoom and
its fellow scriveners may have some colorable claims of free speech protection
that must not be ignored by bar regulators.
III. NONLAWYERS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PUBLISH A BOOK ABOUT THE
LAW
Let us begin with first principles, offered here in their simplest form.
Freedom of speech is a fundamental right receiving heightened judicial
protection. 76 The presumption is in favor of the speaker, and the burden of
proof ordinarily is on the government actor seeking to suppress the speech. 77
In order to punish speech, the government must generally show either that the
expression at issue is not “speech” protected by the First Amendment, or that
the expression falls within one of those categories that the Supreme Court has
defined as entitled to little or no judicial protection against suppression. 78
Otherwise, the central tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence is that speech
will be protected against government censorship, regardless of how
“offensive” it may be. 79 In light of the heavy presumption in favor of speech, it
makes sense when considering a novel First Amendment problem to begin
with the presumption that the speech will be protected before considering
potential justifications for its suppression, rather than automatically assuming
that it can be banned.
As an illustration, let us consider the deceptively simple question of
73. Catherine J. Lanctot, AttorneyClient Relationships in Cyberspace: The Perils and the Promise,
49 DUKE L.J. 147, 177‐78 (1999).
74. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 850‐52.
75. Id.
76. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269‐70 (1964).
77. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 486‐87 (1995).
78. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584‐85 (2010); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376‐77 (1968).
79. Carey v. Population Serv., Int’l., 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (“At least where obscenity is not
involved . . . the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its
suppression.”).
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whether a lay person has a First Amendment right to publish a book
advocating that others take certain actions with respect to their legal rights or
responsibilities. We begin with a book because it is a publication that cannot
be tailored to an individual reader’s personalized set of facts. A book about the
law contains generic information, but cannot—at least under current
technological restrictions—offer personalized advice. If we can establish the
outer bounds on the state’s ability to regulate the publication of legal
information, we would be able to define at least some category of lay “legal”
activity that would be plainly protected by the First Amendment
Imagine a hypothetical book, authored by a nonlawyer, called You Can
Avoid Lawyers!, arguing that the legal profession is nothing but a powerful
moneyed elite, deliberately maintaining a stranglehold on legal services in
order to further its own selfish economic interests. Assume that the book
advocates that lay people no longer consult lawyers for advice for simple
transactions like wills, uncontested divorces, and leases, and argues that those
situations can be easily handled by filling in a standard form. Is this book
protected by the First Amendment?
One would assume that it is obvious that lay people must have a First
Amendment right to speak and write about legal topics and to offer general
opinions about the law. Nevertheless, one of the most notorious lawsuits in the
world of unauthorized practice of law attempted to criminalize the publication
of a book about the law. 80 The book was the national best‐seller How to Avoid
Probate by an estate planner named Norman Dacey. 81 Dacey ultimately
prevailed by asserting his First Amendment rights to publish his book, but the
questions generated by this litigation more than forty years ago have yet to be
definitively resolved. 82
Although I have elsewhere reviewed the Dacey litigation in some detail, 83
a brief recap here will serve to focus our attention on the murky dividing line
between “information” and “advice.” Dacey was not a lawyer but rather an
entrepreneurial estate planner. 84 He had developed his own approach to the
problems of the probate system and published a book that advocated use of a
particular legal device to avoid these problems. 85 The book so captivated the
public that it became the best‐selling nonfiction book of 1966, outstripping
what would have seemed to have been a far more captivating read, the
infamous best‐seller by Masters and Johnson entitled Human Sexual
Response. 86
The organized bar was far less captivated by Dacey’s work. The

80. Grievance Comm. of the Bar of Fairfield Cnty. v. Dacey, 222 A.2d 339 (Conn. 1966).
81. NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE! (1965).
82. Dacey v. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyer’s Ass’n, 290 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y 1968); Lanctot, Scriveners in
Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 827‐29.
83. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 822.
84. Edwin McDowell, Book Notes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1990, at C23.
85. See id. (noting that Dacey instructed his readers on setting up their estates without the
help of lawyers, who were profiting “at the expense of widows and children,” and advised them to
place their assets in a living trust for future beneficiaries.).
86. Id.
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Connecticut Bar Association brought the first lawsuit to prevent Dacey from
assisting lay people to fill out the forms he had devised. 87 This case focused on
actual personalized legal “advice” rather than the booklet in question. 88 In
contrast, the action filed by the New York County Lawyers’ Association against
Dacey sought to enjoin the sale and distribution of his book. 89 Indeed, the trial
court saw no difference between the personalized “advice” Dacey had been
giving in Connecticut and the “advice” he gave to the readers in How to Avoid
Probate!, declaring that “what Dacey did in Connecticut with a small pamphlet
supplemented by a confrontation and which was thereupon enjoined, he is
doing now through his enormously enlarged and radically changed [b]ook.” 90
“As best he can,” the court explained, “he makes the confrontation through the
[b]ook by selection, advice, guidance, instructions, questions, fitting and
fashioning to individual need and by sale and further solicited sale on request
of forms to fit a precise need in a given situation.” 91
The court gave short shrift to Dacey’s claim that he had a free speech right
to publish his book, calling it “ill‐considered” and noting that even the New
York Civil Liberties Union took the position that “unauthorized practice of law
like libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.” 92
The court contended that “[u]nauthorized practice of law cannot be
transferred to the [b]ook and by that device to attain the security of a
constitutional umbrella to immunize against the power of the court to reach
unlawful practice of the law.” 93 Dacey was convicted of a misdemeanor for
willfully engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and permanently
enjoined from disseminating his book or any legal forms. 94 He faced a $250
fine and thirty days in jail. 95
The Appellate Division upheld Dacey’s conviction over a strong dissent in
October 1967, detecting no meaningful difference between direct interaction
with individual clients and publication of a book advocating a particular
course of action. 96 As the Appellate Division explained, the purchaser believed

87. Grievance Comm. of Fairfield, 222 A.2d at 341‐42 (Conn. 1966).
88. Id. at 347 (“When the information given is directed toward a particular person and his
needs and to a particular instrument prepared for his execution, it is no longer within the ‘general
information’ classification but has become legal advice embraced within the phrase ‘practice of
law.’ That was the case here.”). The motion was not filed to enjoin the distribution of How to Avoid
Probate! but rather Dacey’s thirty‐page booklet, “A Modern Plan For Your Tomorrows,” which
included trust and will forms. Id. at 342‐43.
89. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 282 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), rev’d, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967).
90. Id. at 994.
91. Id. at 994.
92. Id. at 988, 995.
93. Id. at 995.
94. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, 987 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), rev’d, 234
N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967). The order banned Dacey from “advising or recommending to the public in
the State of New York . . . that any ‘form’ . . . is legally sufficient, suitable or proper for use for any
specific legal purpose.” Id. at 987‐88.
95. Probate: Taking Dacey Off the Hook, TIME, Jan. 12, 1968, available at
http://www.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,837669,00.html.
96. See Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 991(“It is immaterial that Dacey has no face‐to‐face dealings nor
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that with the book he was obtaining the legal counsel of a fully qualified
expert. 97
Dacey persisted, and he finally achieved victory on his constitutional
claim in the New York Court of Appeals in December 1967. 98 The Court of
Appeals adopted the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division as its own. 99
Tellingly, that opinion drew a sharp distinction between the “publication of a
legal text which purports to say what the law is” and the “essential of legal
practice [which is] the representation and the advising of a particular person
in a particular situation.” 100 Dacey had not engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law merely by publishing a book advocating that others should take
certain steps to protect their assets from probate because “[a]t most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person.” 101
Most noteworthy for our purposes is the acknowledgment that
substantial First Amendment issues also precluded punishing Dacey for
publishing his book, particularly at a time when free speech protection was
not as robust as it is today. Gravely concerned over the prior restraint issues
inherent in an injunction against the sale or publication of a book, the court
noted that How to Avoid Probate! posed no “substantive evil imminently
threatening the public.” 102 If advertisements for the book proved to be “false
and misleading,” they might be subject to restriction under commercial speech
doctrine. 103 Otherwise, there was no constitutional basis for the book’s
suppression. 104 In a plain slap at bar regulators, the court proclaimed, “That it
is not palatable to a segment of society which conceives it as an encroachment
of their special rights hardly justifies banning the book.” 105 Noting that other
books purporting to provide legal advice or criticizing law have already been
published, the court reminded that “[i]t is a prized American privilege to speak
one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions.” 106 With this reversal by the Court of Appeals, Dacey’s victory
appeared complete. Dacey, however, was not yet finished.
Never one to back down from a fight, Dacey promptly sued the New York
a confidential relationship with particular clients.”).
97. Id.
98. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967).
99. Id.
100. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 997‐98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 998 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The opinion further noted that there was no factual
record to show that there had been any harmful effect from the sale or use of Dacey’s book, stating
“[e]very individual has a right to represent himself if he chooses to do so, and to assume the risks
attendant upon what could prove a precarious undertaking.” Id. at 998‐99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1000 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
104. Id. at 1001 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Unless we are to extend a rule of suppression beyond
the obscene, the libelous, utterances of or tending to incitement, and matters similarly
characterized, there is no warrant for the action here taken.”).
105. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 1000‐01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. 2d at 1001 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270
(1941)).
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County Lawyers’ Association for violating his constitutional rights by
attempting to suppress publication and sale of his book. 107 In rejecting the
New York County Lawyers’ Association’s claim of immunity against suit, 108
Judge Irving Kaufman reiterated the First Amendment concerns implicated by
the Association’s actions against Dacey:
The argument Dacey sought to press upon the public—the virtue
of which we do not pass upon—was that the infirmities of the
probate system required every thoughtful person to avoid the
administration of his estate by the probate court. Given this
viewpoint, the forms which comprised the bulk of How [t]o Avoid
Probate! buttressed Dacey’s argument that the goal he advocated
was not only desirable but feasible. Dacey’s book was therefore
protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment’s guarantee of free speech
and any attempt to suppress it on the ground that it constituted
the unauthorized practice of law must be scrutinized with
extreme care. 109

The Dacey litigation thus provides valuable evidence that First Amendment
concerns must be taken seriously when the bar attempts to suppress lay
speech about the law.
Despite the ringing defense of free speech for lay people as early as 1967,
the issue of banning books about the law remains far from settled, particularly
when the law at issue involves the federal income tax. Consider the litigation
against tax protester Irwin Schiff, an ardent opponent of the constitutionality
of the income tax. 110 While serving a prison term for tax evasion, Schiff wrote
his magnum opus, The Federal Mafia: How the Government Illegally Imposes
and Unlawfully Collects Income Taxes, in which he insisted that there was no
legal or constitutional basis for the federal income tax or the Internal Revenue
Service. 111 In 2003, the United States Department of Justice obtained a
preliminary injunction banning the sale and distribution of various tax protest
materials, including Schiff’s book and other information distributed through

107. Dacey v. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers Ass’n, 423 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1969).
108. Id. at 194. The court did not foreclose the possibility of immunity from suit for actions the
Association might take against other individuals. See id. (“We do not suggest, however, that
immunity would be unavailable to the Association in a case in which it had sought to enjoin an
unauthorized practitioner from proffering to specific individuals legal advice relating to their
specific problems or had instituted proceedings to disbar an attorney.”).
109. Id. at 193. Further, without passing on the allegations, the court noted that the inherent
conflict of interest for the Association in suppressing a potential competitor also weighed against
treating the Association the same way as a judge or public prosecutor. See id. at 193‐94 (“We
merely note the inevitable presence of a possible conflict of interest between the purposes served
by the Association and its conception of the public interest whenever it exercises its statutory
power to initiate contempt proceedings under § 750, subd. B and secures an injunction against the
sale and distribution of a book critical of the profession.”).
110. See, e.g., Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Schiff, 801
F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1986); Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1985); Schiff v. Comm’r, 751 F.2d
116 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Schiff, 647 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1981).
111. United States v. Heath, 525 F.3d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 2008).
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various websites. 112
In support of its issuance of the injunction, the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada described the content of the The Federal Mafia
as “largely autobiographical, containing . . . Schiff’s anti‐tax and anti‐
government diatribes and theories” intermingled with his “postulations about
the voluntariness of income tax, and how federal income tax assessment is the
true tax scam.” 113 The book hypes Schiff as a “tax consultant,” holding his
experience in “accounting, economics, actuarial science and law as
qualifications for his services.” 114 In fulfilling its marketing promise as a
resource to avoid paying taxes, The Federal Mafia “contains specific
instructions on how to stop employers from withholding taxes by submitting
an ‘exempt’ W‐4, and how to file ‘zero income’ tax returns.” 115
Schiff’s claim that he had a First Amendment right to publish this book
was joined by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Association of
American Publishers, the American Booksellers Foundation for Free
Expression, the Freedom to Read Foundation of the American Library
Association, and the PEN American Center. 116 Indeed, the ACLU argued that
Schiff’s book did not rise to the level of incitement or aiding and abetting of a
prospective crime, but rather insisted that it constituted “pure speech.” 117 It
further contended that the book could not be banned as false and misleading
commercial speech, noting that the mere fact that a book is sold does not
automatically reduce the constitutional protection afforded to the work. 118
The district court ultimately rejected Schiff’s free speech claims as
unwarranted, in the belief that his book and other promotional materials
constituted “false, misleading and deceptive commercial speech, incitement,
and aiding and abetting illegal conduct.” 119 In applying a “commercial speech
standard to expression,” the Court found that the First Amendment did not
protect Schiff’s book itself in so far as it advertised his fraudulent tax
scheme. 120 Unpersuaded by the large amount of autobiographical and political
material in the book, the court insisted that “the commercial speech
components of The Federal Mafia are not ‘inextricably intertwined’ with its
protected expression.” 121 Indeed, like Norman Dacey’s How to Avoid Probate!,

112. United States v. Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1264 (D. Nev. 2003), aff’d, 379 F.3d 621 (9th
Cir. 2001). See also Schiff, 379 F.3d at 624 (“26 U.S.C. §§ 6700 and 6701 . . . penalize persons who
organize, market, or promote tax evasion schemes.”).
113. Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1267, aff’d on other grounds, 379 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2004).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Post Hearing Brief for ACLU of Nevada et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants,
United States v. Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (May 1, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/
schiff.pdf.
117. Id. at 16.
118. Id. at 6.
119. Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
120. Id. at 1276. “There is no dispute that while the First Amendment protects commercial
speech generally, it does not protect false commercial speech.” Id. at 1273 n.6.
121. Id. at 1277 (citing Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 507 U.S. 410, 426 n.21 (1993); Bd.
of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474‐75 (1989)).
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Schiff’s work was nothing more than a “how‐to manual directed to specific
individuals seeking instructions, sample forms, and attachable affidavits to be
used in the filing of false income tax returns and submission of false W‐4s.” 122
Schiff’s book does not provide the reader with “information or advocacy on tax
reform in general, and then leave the reader to act on his own judgment, or
consider the advice of legitimate tax professionals before engaging in conduct
of legal significance.” 123 The information therein directs the reader “to other
materials, seminars and personal assistance to achieve” the aforementioned in
falsifying federal documents. 124
The Ninth Circuit affirmed this holding in 2004, 125 on the grounds that
Schiff’s book constituted commercial speech under Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York. 126 Noting that
the definition of “commercial speech” was “critical” to its analysis, Schiff
acknowledged that the federal government’s position was that “commercial
speech” reaches not only advertising, but also “expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” 127 Here, the court
explained: “[t]he extravagant claims made in The Federal Mafia are designed to
convince readers that they can lawfully avoid paying their income taxes so that
the readers will buy other products in Schiff’s line.” 128 Noting various portions
of the book, which encourage readers to accept Schiff’s income‐tax theories,
the court stated that “[a]ll of these things under discussion within the book are
made to assure the taxpayer that the taxpayer can legitimately follow these
suggestions and forms.” 129 Thus, the book “is an integral part of Schiff’s whole
program to market his various products for taxpayers to utilize his forms and
techniques to avoid paying income tax.” 130 The court further argued that the
expressive and political aspects of Schiff’s book were not “inextricably
intertwined” with the commercial aspects, because “Schiff can relate his long
history with the IRS and explain his unorthodox tax theories without
simultaneously urging his readers to buy his products.” 131
Despite the potentially sweeping implications of a federal court opinion
upholding the criminalization of selling a book, scholarly commentary on the
Schiff litigation has been surprisingly sparse. 132 Nevertheless, some recent

122. Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. United States v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 631 (9th Cir. 2004).
126. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
127. Schiff, 379 F.3d at 626‐27 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561).
128. Id. at 627.
129. Id. at 627‐28.
130. Id. at 628.
131. Id. at 629.
132. The only extensive discussion of Schiff appears in a student note, Jacqueline K. Hall,
Comment, United States v. Schiff: Commercial Speech Regulation or Free Speech Infringement? 36
SETON HALL L. REV. 551 (2006). Hall concludes that The Federal Mafia was political speech entitled
to the full protection of the First Amendment because it “fits no definition of commercial speech
and cannot be likened to promotional pamphlets or training manuals,” but rather “convincingly
criticizes the practices of the government of the United States.” Id. at 588‐89.
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opinions have reflected more nuanced views of the First Amendment concerns
implicated by these types of lay publications about the law. In United States v.
Bell, 133 the Third Circuit considered whether tax protester Thurston Bell’s
website, “promoting and selling unlawful tax advice,” was entitled to First
Amendment protection. 134 The lower court had held that the website was
nothing more than “the internet version of a television ‘infomercial’” 135 and
thus his “bogus tax advice” could be punished as false and misleading
commercial speech, which enjoys no First Amendment protection. 136 Bell
argued that the permanent injunction barred his political advocacy, which
could not be treated as commercial speech. 137 In response, the court noted that
“[p]ackaging a commercial message with token political commentary does not
insulate commercial speech from appropriate restrictions.” 138 Despite this
holding, the court determined that unless the injunction was read narrowly, it
might in fact intrude upon Bell’s First Amendment rights. 139 In particular, the
court rejected the notion that Bell’s “advocacy” for his ideas on his website
constituted “incitement” under Brandenburg v. Ohio, 140 noting that “the case
does not support an affirmative ban of material posted on a website
advocating against the income tax.” 141
Most recently, in a 2009 opinion, the Seventh Circuit upheld an injunction
issued against the sale of a book entitled The Law That Never Was, which made
the familiar argument of tax opponents that the Sixteenth Amendment had
never been properly ratified. 142 Its author, William Benson, packaged his book
with other legal materials and sold it as a “Sixteenth Amendment Reliance
Package” or “Reliance Defense Package” for $3500, apparently promising

133. 414 F.3d 474 (3d Cir. 2005).
134. Id. at 475.
135. United States v. Bell, 238 F. Supp. 2d 696, 703 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
136. Bell, 414 F.3d at 478.
137. Bell’s argument was twofold. First, he contended that the district court erred in finding
that the materials on his website—www.nite.org—were false commercial speech, unprotected by
the First Amendment. Second, he argued that the injunction was overly broad in that it potentially
restricted him from advocating resistance to the tax laws of the United States—speech for which
he claimed protection in that it does not incite imminent lawless action. Id. at 478.
138. Id. at 480.
139. See id. at 483 (“[T]he offending portions of Bell’s speech may be restricted adequately on
other grounds, including false commercial speech . . . and aiding‐and‐abetting violations of the tax
laws, without raising constitutional questions or distorting Brandenburg.”). For an example of
other courts construing injunctions against tax protestors without reliance on Brandenburg, see
Schiff, 379 F.3d at 629. (“Because we can uphold the injunction as an appropriate restriction on
fraudulent commercial speech, we do not need to address the alternate [basis] cited by the district
court to support the injunction, inciting imminent lawless behavior.”).
140. See 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[C]onstitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.”). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (“But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a
justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is
nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on.”).
141. Bell, 414 F.3d at 483.
142. United States v. Benson, 561 F.3d 718, 728 (7th Cir. 2009).
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customers that his materials would serve as a defense to criminal prosecution
for tax evasion. 143 In rejecting Benson’s free speech claims, the Court of
Appeals asserted that his views on the putatively invalid ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment were “false” and that the “Packages” that he was selling
were clearly commercial speech. 144 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the
court conceded that Benson retained the First Amendment right to sell his
book and otherwise to distribute his views on the Sixteenth Amendment. 145
Indeed, the government disclaimed any intention to foreclose him from
distributing miscellaneous public records related to judicial decisions 146 or
from engaging in the mere sale of his book. 147 He was only foreclosed from
“claiming the ability to rely on it to avoid prosecution.” 148
In light of this precedent, the question of whether a lay person has a First
Amendment right to publish material advocating that others take certain
actions with respect to their legal rights or responsibilities seems far less
settled than originally supposed. The opinions of the New York Court of
Appeals and the Second Circuit in Dacey suggest that the First Amendment
protects the publication of a book about the law. 149 The tax protester opinions
indicate greater complexity. In particular, the more carefully reasoned
opinions in this area indicate potential dangers with sweeping bans on all
speech rather than a more calibrated approach. Speech that is advocacy may
be protected, but speech that furthers a fraudulent scheme is not. 150
I do not wish to overstate a connection between the sale of tax protester
materials and the sale of blank legal documents, but I do want to call attention
to the similarities. Both Dacey and Schiff involved the sale of a book, with
accompanying forms and instructions, in furtherance of a particular theory to
which the author subscribes. 151 Dacey believed that lay people could avoid the
evils of the probate system by applying his theories. 152 Schiff believed that lay
people can avoid the evils of the federal income‐tax system by applying his

143. Id. at 720‐21.
144. Id. at 726.
145. Id. at 725. “Benson may openly share his views about the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment or the tyranny of the federal government and IRS. It is not illegal for Benson to urge
his followers to take political action. . . . [A]ccording to our great tradition of tolerating nutty
opinions, the marketplace of ideas remains open to Benson.” Id. at 726.
146. Id. at 725.
147. Benson, 561 F.3d at 725 n.2.
148. See United States v. Schulz, 529 F. Supp. 2d 341, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3706 (2d. Cir. 2008) (noting that much of tax protestor's speech is “protected speech,” such
as speeches on constitutionality of Sixteenth Amendment, but the fraudulent tax‐shelter scheme
could be punished either as speech facilitating an unlawful act, fraudulent commercial speech, or
incitement of illegal conduct).
149. Dacey, 423 F.2d at 193; Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 1000‐01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1280 (“It is well‐settled precedent that the First Amendment
protects an individual’s right to disagree with the law and to advocate the violation of a law. There
is no protection, however, for speech or advocacy that is directed toward producing imminent
lawless action.”) (internal citations omitted).
151. Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1267; Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
152. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
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theories. 153 Both authors were selling their books for profit. 154 Both authors
found themselves on the receiving end of a criminal prosecution. 155 Of course,
the theory for suppressing Dacey’s book was that it constituted the
unauthorized practice of law, while the theory for suppressing Schiff’s book
was that it is fraudulent commercial speech. 156 But if Dacey’s book were to be
published today, the question arises whether it too could now be legitimately
suppressed under commercial speech doctrine. Indeed, if the commercial
speech doctrine in Schiff is an accurate statement of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, it would seem to provide a powerful weapon for bar regulators
to defeat any First Amendment challenge to unauthorized practice
prosecutions.
What is the relevance of this precedent to the LegalZoom conundrum?
First, it suggests that there is some constitutional protection for nonlawyer
advocacy about the law. Second, it indicates that the government may attempt
to use the less stringent tests for commercial speech to justify its regulation.
Third, it cautions that simply calling something “commercial speech” does not
make it so.
IV. IS ADVOCATING THAT CONSUMERS SHOULD NOT HIRE LAWYERS PROTECTED SPEECH?
LegalZoom and other lay legal document preparers are not publishing
books about the law. Nevertheless, much of their written material on their
websites and elsewhere might well be characterized as “advocacy.” To the
extent that these companies attempt to convince consumers that they should
not hire lawyers to prepare certain documents, is this speech protected under
the First Amendment? If we can answer this question, then we can at least
establish some principles for determining with more precision where the line
between “legal information” and “legal advice” might appropriately be drawn.
The answer to this question may again seem to be obvious. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that speech urging others to take
action to enforce their rights implicates First Amendment concerns. 157 As early
as 1945, in its 5‐4 decision in Thomas v. Collins, 158 the Court struck down as a
prior restraint a state requirement that labor organizers register with the
government before “soliciting” workers to join unions. 159 Texas had contended
that its regulation targeted conduct, in the form of “business practices,” rather
153. Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1267.
154. Id.; Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
155. Schiff was prosecuted for engaging in “fraudulent or deceptive conduct that substantially
interferes with the proper administration of the IRS Code.” Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1265. Dacey
was prosecuted for “criminal contempt” arising from “unauthorized practice of law within the
State of New York.” Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
156. Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1272; Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 987‐88.
157. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy or the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.”).
158. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
159. Id. at 518.
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than speech. 160 Writing for the majority, Justice Rutledge noted that the state
law’s effect “was to prohibit Thomas not only to solicit members and
memberships, but also to speak in advocacy of the cause of trade unionism in
Texas, without having first procured the card.” 161
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson wrestled with the difference
between “advocacy” and “practice.” He argued there was a rough distinction,
whereby a state could prohibit an unlicensed person from practicing law as a
vocation, but could not prohibit that person from speaking about any kinds or
rights or advocating that his audience organize based on his speech. 162
So the state . . . may regulate one who makes a business or a
livelihood of soliciting funds or memberships for unions. But I do
not think it can prohibit one, even if he is a salaried labor leader,
from making an address to a public meeting of workmen, telling
them their rights as he sees them and urging them to unite in
general or to join a specific union. 163

Jackson’s concurrence identifies the threshold concern of distinguishing
between conduct and speech.
Assuming that Thomas establishes some general principle that the state
may not punish advocacy of taking certain economic action by claiming that it
is an “act” rather than “speech,” the question remains whether encouraging lay
people to avoid lawyers when they need a divorce or a will would qualify as
protected advocacy within the meaning of the First Amendment. An
instructive early case is the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n. 164 In that case, the Illinois State Bar
Association obtained an injunction against the local affiliate of the United Mine
Workers for employing an attorney on its staff to represent union members in
workers compensation claims, on the grounds that it was “unauthorized
practice of law opinions.” 165 The Supreme Court reversed, stating: “We hold
that the freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments gives petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a
salary basis to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights.” 166 It
explained: “[B]road rules framed to protect the public and to preserve respect
for the administration of justice can in their actual operation significantly
impair the value of associational freedoms.” 167
Most noteworthy about this opinion is that the litigation at issue was not
aimed at the vindication of constitutional rights, but rather at the arguably

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 526.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 544‐45.
389 U.S. 217 (1967).
Id. at 218.
Id. at 221‐222.
Id. at 222.
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more mundane enforcement of workers compensation claims. 168 Indeed, the
Illinois Supreme Court found that representation in workers compensation
claims did not implicate political speech and association. 169 Nevertheless,
Justice Black identified broader concerns raised by the attempt to invoke the
unauthorized practice statute here:
The litigation in question is, of course, not bound up with
political matters of acute social moment, as in Button, but the
First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to
the extent it can be characterized as political. Great secular
causes, with small ones, are guarded. The grievances for redress
of which the right of petition was insured, and with it the right of
assembly, are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights
of free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of
human interest. 170

Similarly, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia
State Bar, 171 the Court reversed an injunction preventing a labor union from
advising its members to seek representation from particular lawyers as
violative of the First Amendment. 172 The Court explained:
It cannot be seriously doubted that the First Amendment’s
guarantees of free speech, petition and assembly give railroad
workers the right to gather together for the lawful purpose of
helping and advising one another in asserting the rights
Congress gave them in the Safety Appliance Act and the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act, statutory rights which would be vain
and futile if the workers could not talk together freely as to the
best course to follow. 173

The Court found that the right of the union members to consult with each
other necessarily included the right to select a spokesperson to give the best
advice. 174 Further the right of the workers to advise their fellow members on
legal assistance and recommendations of lawyers was “an inseparable part of
this constitutionally guaranteed right to assist and advise each other.” 175 As to
the objection that this constituted unauthorized practice, the Court responded
that “[t]he railroad workers, by recommending competent lawyers to each
other, obviously are not themselves engaging in the practice of law, nor are

168. Id. at 218.
169. See, e.g., Illinois State Bar Ass’n v. United Mine Workers, 219 N.E.2d 503, 509 (Ill. 1966),
vacated, 389 US. 217 (1967) (distinguishing “constitutionally protected political expression” from
“bodily injury litigation”).
170. 389 U.S. at 223 (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 531).
171. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id. at 5‐6
174. Id. at 6.
175. Id. at 7.
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they or the lawyers whom they select parties to any soliciting of business.” 176
Of course, when the legal issue at stake itself implicates important
constitutional issues, the Court has been particularly protective of free speech
rights to litigate those issues. In 1963, for example, the Supreme Court
confronted the use of unauthorized practice statutes against civil rights groups
in National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button. 177 The
Court rejected the attempt by the state of Virginia to ban litigation activities by
the NAACP Defense Fund, including the referral of potential litigants to
particular attorneys. 178 The Court noted that litigation was a method of
political expression for the NAACP Defense Fund who utilized lawsuits as a
form of advocacy and “a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality
of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the
Negro community in this country.” 179
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that Virginia did not have a
compelling interest, “[f]or a State may not, under the guise of prohibiting
professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights.” 180 Similarly, in In Re
Primus, 181 the Supreme Court held that the state could not constitutionally ban
solicitation of prospective litigants by nonprofit organizations that engage in
litigation as a form of political expression. 182 The Court treated such
solicitation as an aspect of the right of freedom of association, which
outweighed the state’s interest in guarding against the evils of solicitation of
clients for purposes of economic gain. 183
In its 2001 opinion in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 184 the Supreme
Court struck down a federal law that prevented lawyers who receive grants
from the Legal Services Corporation from arguing against the constitutionality
of any existing welfare law. 185 Writing for the five‐justice majority, Justice
Kennedy rejected the argument that such a restriction was a legitimate
regulation of government‐sponsored speech under Rust v. Sullivan. 186 He

176. Id. at 6‐7.
177. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
178. Id. at 426 (“Specifically the court held that, under the expanded definition, such activities
on the part of NAACP, the Virginia Conference, and the Defense Fund constituted ‘fomenting and
soliciting legal business in which they are not parties and have no pecuniary right or liability, and
which they channel to the enrichment of certain lawyers employed by them, at no cost to the
litigants and over which the litigants have no control.’” (quoting NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142,
155 (1960))).
179. Id. at 429.
180. Id. at 439.
181. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
182. Id. at 434.
183. Id. at 436‐37 (stating that “considerations of undue commercialization of the legal
profession are of marginal force where, as here, a nonprofit organization offers its services free of
charge”).
184. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
185. Id. at 537. “As interpreted by the LSC and by the Government, the restriction prevents an
attorney from arguing to a court that a state statute conflicts with a federal statute or that either a
state or federal statute by its terms or in its application is violative of the United States
Constitution.” Id.
186. Id. at 543; see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding a law forbidding recipients
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explained that “[t]here can be little doubt that the LSC Act funds
constitutionally protected expression” 187 because the program was “designed
to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message.” 188 In
spite of the receipt of government funds, the LSC‐funded lawyer is acting on
the behalf of her indigent client and in opposition to the government’s denial
of benefits and thus “[t]he lawyer is not the government’s speaker.” 189 Thus,
Justice Kennedy explained, “[t]he advice from the attorney to the client and the
advocacy by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as governmental
speech even under a generous understanding of the concept.” 190
The Court further explained that a restriction on what arguments may be
presented in litigation “distorts the legal system by altering the traditional role
of the attorneys.” 191 Justice Kennedy added:
By seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to
truncate presentation to the courts, the enactment under review
prohibits speech and expression upon which courts must depend for
the proper exercise of the judicial power. Congress cannot wrest the
law from the Constitution which is its source. 192

Thus, he largely rested this holding on a threat of “severe impairment of the
judicial function.” 193 Moreover, it has recognized that even litigation about
“mundane” matters may be protected by the First Amendment. 194 The
precedent certainly seems broad enough to protect our hypothetical best‐
seller You Can Avoid Lawyers!.
But what happens when the advocacy is combined with other documents,
such as legal forms, that purport to put the advocacy into action? A tax
protester may be able to advocate that the Sixteenth Amendment is invalid,
but if he furnishes legal forms to assist others to accomplish that objective, he
may no longer be able to claim the shield of the First Amendment. On the other
hand, Norman Dacey’s best‐seller was deemed to be protected free speech
even though it was coupled with legal forms. 195 For tax protester cases, the
forms transform the advocacy into either incitement or fraudulent commercial
speech. 196 For online document preparers, the question is whether the sale of
forms transforms the advocacy into “legal advice,” and therefore the conduct
of unauthorized practice of law, or into fraudulent commercial speech. In
of Title X funding from discussing abortion with patients).
187. Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. at 548.
188. Id. at 542.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 542‐43.
191. Id. at 544.
192. Id. at 545.
193. Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. at 546.
194. See pp. 12123 above.
195. Dacey, 423 F.2d at 193.
196. See United States v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144 (7d Cir. 1987) (declaring the actions of tax
protesters who promoted not paying taxes to be fraudulent speech); Bell, 414 F.3d 474 (deciding
that the actions of a tax protesting website incited illegal activity).

Season 200N]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

125

order to answer this question, we must consider two issues separately:
whether the sale of blank legal forms is protected free speech, and whether
filling in the legal forms on behalf of another alters the equation.
V. IS THERE A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SELL BLANK LEGAL FORMS?
As I explained above, the Dacey litigation in New York suggests that
nonlawyers do have First Amendment rights to disseminate information about
the law, as long as the information does not constitute personalized legal
advice. 197 It bears noting, however, that an arm of the Connecticut State Bar
also brought an action against Dacey around the same time. The claim was
based not on a book as in New York, but his distribution of a thirty‐page
booklet advocating use of the so‐called “Dacey Trust” and “Dacey Will,” and his
meeting with “clients” to assist them in filling out the forms. 198 The
Connecticut Supreme Court ultimately held that Dacey’s activities presented a
“sordid picture” and constituted unauthorized practice, explaining: “The
determination that a given form should be followed without change is as much
an exercise of legal judgment as is a determination that it should be changed in
given particulars. In either case, legal judgment is used in the adaptation of the
form to the specific needs and situation of the client.” 199
In a previous article, I extensively canvassed the case law relating to
“scriveners” as it relates to unauthorized practice of law. 200 The question at
issue here is whether there is any First Amendment right to be a scrivener on
behalf of another. Courts occasionally have addressed this issue in passing. In
the 1969 case of Palmer v. Unauthorized Practice Committee of the State Bar of
Texas, 201 the court enjoined the sale of blank will forms by a lay person, on the
theory that a form is “almost a will itself” and is “misleading and certainly will
lead to unfortunate consequences for any layman who might rely upon the
‘form’ and the definitions attached.” 202 Palmer briefly acknowledged and then
dismissed a possible free speech challenge to its holding, noting that
“[c]onstitutional rights of speech, publication and obligation of contract are
not absolute, and in a given case where the public interest is involved, courts
are entitled to strike a balance between fundamental constitutional freedoms
and the state’s interest in the welfare of its citizens.” 203 As the statute at hand
was “enacted in the interest of public welfare and safety for the purpose of
prohibiting the practice of law by unqualified and unlicensed persons under

197. See Dacey, 423 F.2d at 193 (explaining how Dacey’s book, which included legal forms,
could be protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech, and how trying to suppress
that speech based on the idea that it constituted unauthorized practice of law should be
scrutinized).
198. Grievance Committee of Bar of Fairfield County v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 133 (Conn. 1966).
199. Id. at 141.
200. See Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace, supra note 2 at 829‐36 (discussing how courts have
addressed the preparation of standard legal forms by lay people).
201. 438 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
202. Id. at 376.
203. Id. at 376‐77.
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the State’s police power,” 204 the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
expression and of contract had to “yield to permit the rendition of such decree
as is necessary for the reasonable protection of the public.” 205 Obviously
reflecting a far less sophisticated approach to the First Amendment than
would be expected today, Palmer nevertheless stands as evidence of the
mechanical rejection of free speech claims in unauthorized practice cases. 206
Despite Palmer’s precedent, the constitutional issue with respect to
publication of legal information reemerged in 1998. 207 The Texas Bar’s
Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee attempted to enjoin the sale of a CD‐
ROM entitled “Quicken Family Lawyer.” 208 The software contained one
hundred different legal forms and instructions on how to fill them out. 209 As
such, the software resembled a legal form book. Unlike the form book
however, the software prompted a user for certain information—such as state
of residence—and then would identify particular forms as being suitable for
that particular state. 210 Answers input by the user to other questions would
likewise generate forms specifically marked as appropriate to the provided
information. 211 If the user decided to review a particular legal form, the
software again had a series of prompts to assist in filling in the blanks, and
altered the form accordingly.
In 1999, a federal district court held that the sale of this computer
software in Texas constituted unauthorized practice of law and was
unprotected by the First Amendment. 212 Judge Barefoot Sanders concluded
that the software “purports to select” the appropriate document, “customizes
the documents” and “creates an air of reliability about the documents, which
increases the likelihood that an individual user will be misled into relying on
them.” 213 As to the constitutional issue, the court explained that application of
the unauthorized practice statute here did not “substantially burden” more
speech than necessary, and that the government’s interest would be achieved

204. Id. at 377.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Fadia v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, 830 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.
1992). The Texas Court of Appeals upheld an injunction forbidding the sale of a book entitled You
and Your Will: A DoItYourself Manual. The book apparently included “information on how to
prepare a will,” as well as “fill‐in‐the‐blank forms.” Id. at 163. “Because a will secures legal rights
and involves the giving of advice requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, the preparation of a
will involves the practice of law.” Id. at 164. The court rejected the invitation to overrule Palmer as
a request to “legislate from the bench,” and treated the First Amendment issue as not preserved
for appeal. Id.
207. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813. The Unauthorized Practice
of Law Committee of the Texas Bar (UPLC), made up of six Texas lawyers and three lay citizens
appointed by the Supreme Court of Texas, has the responsibility for enforcing Texas’ authorized
practice of law statutes. Id. at *2. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Lanctot, Scriveners in
Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 836.
208. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813, at *2.
209. Id.
210. Id. at *5
211. Id.
212. Id. at *18.
213. Id.
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“less effectively absent the regulation.” 214 It candidly stated:
Absent the regulation, as it is being applied in this case, the
State’s ability to combat the unauthorized practice of law in the
computer age would be hindered. The State possesses an interest
in protecting the uninformed and unwary from overly‐simplistic
legal advice. The UPLC does not seek to prevent the simple
provision of information concerning legal rights; rather, it seeks
to prevent the citizens of Texas from being lulled into a false
sense of security that if they use QFL they will have a “legally
valid” document that’s “tailored to [their] situation” and “best
meets their needs.” If the UPLC is prevented from prosecuting
Parsons, the State’s interests in preventing those who are not
authorized to practice law from giving legal advice would be less
effectively achieved. 215

The First Amendment holding did not last for long. After a vigorous
lobbying campaign, the Texas State Legislature amended its unauthorized
practice of law statute to permit the sale of software like Quicken Family
Lawyer. 216 In response, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the district
court’s opinion in Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons
Technology, Inc., 217 without ever reaching the constitutional question. 218 Since
Parsons, no court decision has addressed the constitutional question
presented by the sale of blank legal forms.
In my view, a blank legal form for a will, a simple divorce, or a lease,
would presumptively qualify as “speech” under the First Amendment in light
of the cases previously discussed. The more pressing question is whether the
government would have a plausible defense for restricting such speech.
Commercial speech doctrine provides a tempting refuge for bar regulators
who wish to prosecute lay people who sell legal publications or other legal
products, and so the argument merits close examination here.
For purposes of analyzing this thread of First Amendment doctrine, let us
assume the following: first, assume the publication (whether it is a book, a
blank legal form, or a software package) is not tailored to the particular needs
of an individual consumer. Rather, the consumer purchases the item, and then
makes the decision about what information to insert into the form. This is true
even in the case of Quicken Family Lawyer, where the actual personalization of

214. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813, at *29.
215. Id. at *29‐30.
216. See Julee Fischer, Policing the SelfHelp Legal Market: Consumer Protection or Protection of
the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L. REV. 121, 132 n.84 (2000) (explaining the passage of the new
legislation in Texas that ultimately allowed the sale of software such as Quicken Family Lawyer).
As ultimately adopted, the amendment to Sec. 81.101 read: “[T]he ‘practice of law’ does not
include the design, creation, publication, distribution, display, or sale . . . [of] computer software,
or similar products if the products clearly and conspicuously state that the products are not a
substitute for the advice of an attorney.” 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 799 (H.B 1507) (West).
217. 179 F.3d 956.
218. Id.
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the document is done by the user, not by the seller, through the process of
providing certain information and receiving certain forms in return for the
request. Second, we will assume that the author is advocating a position on
how some legal problem should be resolved.
Although much debated, the basic contours of commercial speech
doctrine are well established. The traditional test articulated in Central Hudson
may only command a slim majority of support on the current Supreme Court,
but it remains the benchmark for evaluating commercial speech claims:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest. 219

Of course, the threshold question is whether the speech in question can
fairly be characterized as “commercial speech” for purposes of applying the
Central Hudson test. 220 In particular, the question raised by lay publications
about the law is whether they can be treated as commercial speech, either by
virtue of being offered for sale themselves, or because they are intertwined
with proposals that urge readers to purchase other products, or because they
constitute “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience,” as the government successfully argued in Schiff. 221
The mere fact that a publication is sold for a profit cannot itself suffice to
characterize its content as “commercial speech.” 222 Indeed, were that the rule,
the scope of First Amendment protection would be reduced to almost nothing.
The Court has previously noted that the mere fact that speech is made for a
profit does not convert it to speech that proposes a commercial transaction,
noting: “Some of our most valued forms of fully protected speech are uttered
for a profit.” 223 Nevertheless, the doctrine permits the government to ban
speech that advertises an illegal product, or commercial speech that is false or
misleading. 224

219. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
220. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976) (asking more broadly “whether speech which does ‘no more than propose a
commercial transaction’ is so removed from any ‘exposition of ideas’ and from ‘truth, science,
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of
Government’ that it lacks all protection” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
221. 379 F.3d at 626‐27 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561).
222. Fox, 492 U.S. at 482.
223. Id.
224. See generally Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD.
L. REV. 55 (1999) (reviewing the evolution of the definition of commercial speech and the
problems with definitional boundaries).
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Only by contorting the meaning of “advertising” can one consider a book
of will forms to be commercial speech, or even a book touting a particular
method of avoiding probate. Defining generic lay speech about the law as
commercial speech would be inconsistent with the First Amendment. A book
or CD‐ROM containing will forms is not itself commercial speech even if one
charges money for it. Categorizing such speech as commercial speech would
be designed simply to guard the legal profession against economic
competition. 225
In addition, it is well established that if noncommercial speech is
“inextricably intertwined” with commercial speech, then the Court will treat
the entire content as protected. 226 In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of
North Carolina, 227 the Supreme Court explained: “[W]here . . . the component
parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we cannot parcel out the
speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another phrase. . . .
Therefore, we apply our test for fully protected expression.” 228
Similarly, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,
the Court considered the constitutionality of a school regulation that generally
prohibited commercial enterprises from operating on state campuses. 229
Students challenging the regulation argued that some commercial activities,
such as “Tupperware parties,” inextricably intertwined speech proposing that
the listeners purchase certain products with more general speech about topics
of public interest. 230 Here, however, the Court found that unlike Riley, the mere
presence of some discussion of matters of “home economics” did not suffice to
convert commercial speech into noncommercial speech. 231 Because the home
economic elements did not convert the presentations into intertwined
educational speech, the speech merely linked products with protected
elements and remained commercial speech, warranting no constitutional
protection. 232
Several years ago, the issue of intertwined commercial and
noncommercial speech briefly surfaced before the Supreme Court in the high‐
profile litigation in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky. 233 Nike had embarked upon a public
relations campaign to defend itself against charges that it mistreated workers
in foreign facilities and had been sued under California state law for allegedly
unfair and deceptive practices. 234 The trial court sustained Nike’s demurrer to

225. See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyer Advertising and the Philosophical Origins of the
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 91, 124‐36 (2002) (arguing that the government
should not regulate commercial speech in order to change consumer habits, but should only seek
to encourage rational decision‐making).
226. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. 492 U.S. at 471‐72.
230. Id. at 473‐74.
231. Id. at 474 (“No law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without
teaching home economics, or to teach home economics without selling housewares.”).
232. Id. at 474‐75 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5).
233. 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted.
234. Id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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the complaint that its speech was protected under the First Amendment,
which respondent then appealed numerous times until the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 235 In a concurring opinion in support of the dismissal of
certiorari, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter, explained
the difficulties of the First Amendment issue raised in Nike.
Justice Stevens took the position that the speech at issue in Nike
intertwined noncommercial speech, including “debate on an issue of public
importance,” with commercial speech. 236 Accepting the facts and claims
alleged in the complaint as true, Nike’s statements included “significant factual
misstatements” meant to “generate sales.” 237 These factual misstatements
justified a regulatory interest to protect consumers from false statements of
fact, which the court provides no “constitutional value.” 238 But the same
communications “were part of ongoing discussion and debate about important
public issues.” 239 This discussion and debate was deserving of protection
“from the chilling effect of the prospect of expensive litigation.” 240
In contrast, Justices Breyer and O’Connor argued that the case should
have been considered on its merits, and that the speech should not have been
treated as commercial speech because it addressed a matter of public
concern. 241 First, Justice Breyer noted that in commercial speech cases the
First
Amendment
“‘embraces at least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of
public concern.’” 242 He further explained that the communications at issue had
both “commercial and noncommercial (public‐issue‐oriented) elements” that
were “inextricably intertwined.” 243 The constitutional issue raised in Nike has
yet to be fully resolved.
One might anticipate the argument that the sale of a blank legal form to
another converts the document into commercial speech. Of course, the
Supreme Court has never taken the position that mere sale of one’s words
converts the expression automatically into commercial speech. But even if that
extreme view of commercial speech were to be adopted, under Central Hudson
and its progeny, the government may ban commercial speech only if it is “false,
misleading, or proposes an illegal transaction.” 244 Unless bar regulators are
prepared to take the position that all blank legal forms are inherently

235. Id. at 656‐57.
236. Id. at 663.
237. Id. at 663‐64.
238. Id. at 664 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).
239. Nike, Inc., 539 U.S. at 664.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 667 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 676 (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980)). Justice
Breyer further noted that under Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence, speech implicating
matters of public concern must be given “breathing space” in order to survive. Id. (citing New York
Times Co., 376 U.S. at 272).
243. Id. at 676‐677 (citing Riley, 487 U.S. at 796).
244. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564
(discussing limits on government power to regulate speech that is not misleading or related to
unlawful activities).
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fraudulent or misleading, this blanket argument seems unlikely to prevail. A
lay person who publishes a book entitled You Pay Too Much In Taxes, or You
Don’t Need A Lawyer has not necessarily engaged in commercial speech just
because the book is offered for sale, even if the book includes blank legal forms
designed to effectuate the author's proposed solution. Careful application of
traditional First Amendment principles would require, at a minimum, that the
book be examined to see whether it contains aspects which propose a
commercial transaction (e.g., “buy my special will forms”). Even if such
commercial speech aspects are present in the publication, if they are
“inextricably intertwined” with noncommercial speech elements, the entire
work will be treated as core First Amendment speech and will be afforded the
highest degree of constitutional protection.
The constitutional question raised by LegalZoom and other document
preparers must then boil down to this: if advocating that lay people should not
pay lawyers to prepare simple legal documents is protected speech, and if
blank legal forms are also protected speech, then what is it about the entry of
consumer information into those forms that creates unprotected speech? This
question has received almost no attention to date, and may prove critical as
bar regulators begin to take action against these legal scriveners. As a final
matter, let us turn briefly to this question.
VI.

DOES FILLING OUT LEGAL FORMS FOR A PAYING CUSTOMER REMOVE FIRST

AMENDMENT PROTECTION?
The arguments made by bar regulators with respect to the preparation of
legal forms by LegalZoom and others generally center on the assertion that
filling out the forms is the same as giving “legal advice.” Assuming that this
would be sustainable under a particular unauthorized practice of law statute,
would a First Amendment challenge to such an assertion even pass the
threshold for a nonfrivolous defense? These issues are obviously quite
complext. Although a fuller exploration of these arguments must await
another day, I will briefly sketch out three likely responses to be raised to such
an assertion.
A. Objection 1: “It’s Not Speech. Giving Legal Advice Is Conduct and Thus Not
Protected by the First Amendment.”
As a threshold matter, bar regulators are likely to argue that what a
company likeLegalZoom does is not speech, but the “conduct” of “the
unauthorized practice of law.” By characterizing the preparation of these
forms as “legal advice,” then, the bar converts what might otherwise be
protected speech between lay entities to the conduct of practicing law without
a license.
In order to appreciate the nuances of this argument, consider why
practicing law without a license is banned in the first place. Plainly it is not
solely because the content of the speech itself is somehow dangerous to
society, as the prohibition does not hinge on whether the “legal advice” given
was good or bad. Indeed, the reason such “speech” may be banned is not
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because of its content, but because of the identity of the speaker. 245 In other
words, the “advice” to a lay person to “sue before Friday because the statute of
limitations will expire” is permissible if the speaker is a lawyer and thus
authorized by the state to make such a statement, but it presumably is
forbidden without that license. One could also imagine an argument that the
state is in fact suppressing the communication of a message by the lay
speaker—the message that no lawyer is necessary to provide the information.
Is the mere invocation that something is “legal advice” sufficient to place
it within the hands of the state to regulate or ban? The Court has not
specifically addressed the question of lay persons giving advice about the law,
although it was raised by Justice Douglas in dissenting to the dismissal of
Hackin v. Arizona. 246 In Hackin, a nonlawyer was convicted of unauthorized
practice of law because he represented an indigent prisoner in a habeas
action. 247 Justice Douglas would have heard the First Amendment challenge,
explaining: “[w]hether a State, under guise of protecting its citizens from legal
quacks and charlatans, can make criminals of those who, in good faith and for
no personal profit, assist the indigent to assert their constitutional rights is a
substantial question this Court should answer.” 248 Justice Douglas argued that
the lack of adequate legal services for the poor called for innovative solutions,
including permitting limited lay representation in some matters not requiring
a lawyer’s skill. 249 He noted: “The line that marks the area into which the
layman may not step except at his peril is not clear. I am by no means sure the
line was properly drawn by the court below where no lawyer could be found
and this layman apparently served without a fee.” 250 Perhaps foreshadowing
the current debate, Justice Douglas warned:
[S]tatutes with the broad sweep of the Arizona provision now
before this Court would appear to have the potential to “freeze
out” the imaginative new attempts to assist indigents realize
equal justice, merely because lay persons participate. . . . It may
well be that until the goal of free legal assistance to the indigent
in all areas of the law is achieved, the poor are not harmed by
well‐meaning, charitable assistance of laymen. On the contrary,
for the majority of indigents . . . lay assistance may be the only

245. See Janson, 727 F. Supp. 2d 782 (discussing the unauthorized practice of law); Dacey, 282
N.Y.S. 2d at 995 (discussing the unauthorized practice of law).
246. 389 U.S. 143 (1967) (appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question).
247. Id. at 143‐44 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The lay person in question graduated from an
unaccredited law school and was refused admission to the Arizona Bar. Id. at 144 (Douglas, J.
dissenting).
248. Id. at 144 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
249. Id. at 151‐52(Douglas, J. dissenting).
250. Id. at 150 (Douglas, J. dissenting). Douglas went on to state that “[b]roadly phrased
unauthorized‐practice‐of‐law statutes such as that at issue here could make criminal many of the
activities regularly done by social workers who assist the poor in obtaining welfare and attempt to
help them solve domestic problems. Such statutes would also tend to deter programs in which
experienced welfare recipients represent other, less articulate, recipients before local welfare
departments.” Hackin, 389 U.S. at 150(Douglas, J. dissenting).
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hope for achieving equal justice at this time. 251

Justice Douglas’s dissent notwithstanding, the Court has yet to enter this fray.
Additional insight into the First Amendment issues presented by “advice‐
giving” may be gleaned from the Supreme Court’s 1985 opinion in Lowe v.
Securities and Exchange Commission. 252 In Lowe, the Court overturned a ruling
of the SEC that forbade the publication of semimonthly newsletters containing
investment advice and commentary. 253 The SEC’s position was based on the
fact that the publishers had been convicted of various securities violations and
that they were not registered as investment advisers as required by federal
law. 254 The newsletter “contained general commentary about the securities
and bullion markets, reviews of market indicators and investment strategies,
and specific recommendations for buying, selling, or holding stocks and
bullion.” 255 They also advertised a hotline that readers could call to get current
investment advice. 256 Although the newsletter was supposed to be a
semimonthly publication, only eight issues were published during the fifteen
months after the 1981 order. 257
Although the District Court distinguished between “nonpersonalized”
advice and “person‐to‐person” advice in fashioning relief, the Second Circuit
held that both types of advice could appropriately be enjoined. 258 The lower
courts were unable to agree on whether such advice‐giving was fraudulent
commercial speech and thus bannable, or protected free speech that had been
improperly enjoined. 259 The Court carefully reviewed the statutory scheme
and concluded that the publishers here did not meet the statutory definition of
“investment adviser;” however, it determined that the publishers did fall
under the statutory exclusion for “the publisher of any bona fide newspaper,
news magazine or business or financial publication of general and regular
circulation.” 260

251. Id. at 151‐52 (Douglas, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original).
252. 472 U.S. 181.
253. Id. at 211.
254. Id. at 184, 197.
255. Id. at 185.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 185.
258. 472 U.S. at 186‐87. The view of the majority was that the words of the statute drew no
distinction between personalized and impersonal advice. Id. at 187.
259. Id. at 187‐88. In fact, the Court of Appeals invoked the unauthorized practice of law when
it reasoned that an injunction which required that the publishers "not sell their views as to the
purchase, sale, or holding of certain securities is no different from saying that a disbarred lawyer
may not sell legal advice." Id. at 188 (citing SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 902 (2d Cir. 1984)).
260. Id. at 209‐11. The Court further explained:
Congress did not intend to exclude publications that are distributed by
investment advisers as a normal part of the business of servicing their
clients. The legislative history plainly demonstrates that Congress was
primarily interested in regulating the business of rendering personalized
investment advice, including publishing activities that are a normal incident
thereto. On the other hand, Congress, plainly sensitive to First Amendment
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The Court’s First Amendment concerns focused on the doctrine of prior
restraint, as developed in such cases as Near v. Minnesota 261 and Lovell v. City
of Griffin. 262 The Court noted that the legislative history expressly mentioned
Lovell and explained: “The reasoning of Lovell, particularly since the case was
cited in the legislative history, supports a broad reading of the exclusion for
publishers.” 263 Here, “[b]ecause the content of petitioners’ newsletters was
completely disinterested, and because they were offered to the general public
on a regular schedule, they are described by the plain language of the
exclusion.” 264 The Court summarized later, “[t]he mere fact that a publication
contains advice and comment about specific securities does not give it the
personalized character that identifies a professional investment adviser.” 265
The majority read the statutory exclusion broadly to exclude these
newsletters, thereby avoiding a potential First Amendment difficulty.
Three justices would have reached the First Amendment question and
held that the federal statute was unconstitutional as applied to the newsletter
publisher. 266 Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, argued: “One does not have to read the Court’s opinion very closely
to realize that its interpretation of the Act is in fact based on a thinly disguised
conviction that the Act is unconstitutional as applied to prohibit publication of
newsletters by unregistered advisers.” 267 Indeed, Justice White described the
case as “a collision between the power of government to license and regulate
those who would pursue a profession or vocation and the rights of freedom of
speech and of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment.” 268 He explained
that the government plainly has the power to regulate entry into a profession,
even if that profession encompasses aspects of free speech: 269
Perhaps the most obvious example of a “speaking profession”
that is subject to governmental licensing is the legal
profession. Although a lawyer’s work is almost entirely
devoted to the sort of communicative acts that, viewed in
concerns, wanted to make clear that it did not seek to regulate the press
through the licensing of nonpersonalized publishing activities.
Id. at 204.
261. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
262. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
263. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 205.
264. Id. at 206.
265. Id. at 208.
266. Id. at 211.
267. Id. at 226.
268. Id. at 228.
269. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 228 (Justice White continued: “The Court determined long ago that
although ‘[i]t is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful
calling, business, or profession he may choose, . . . there is no arbitrary deprivation of such right
where its exercise is not permitted because of a failure to comply with conditions imposed . . . for
the protection of society.’ Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121‐22 (1889). Regulations on entry
into a profession, as a general matter, are constitutional if they ‘have a rational connection with
the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice’ the profession. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).”).
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isolation, fall within the First Amendment’s protection, we
have never doubted that “[a] State can require high standards
of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency
in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar . . . .” 270
Justice White recognized the government’s argument “that these same
principles support the legitimacy of its regulation of the investment advisory
profession, whether conducted through publications or through personal
client‐adviser relationships.” 271 He drew a sharp distinction however, between
restricting entry into a profession and licensing the speech of the press: 272 “At
some point, a measure is no longer a regulation of a profession but a
regulation of speech or of the press; beyond that point, the statute must
survive the level of scrutiny demanded by the First Amendment.” 273
Although he acknowledged that the state has the power to regulate
professional conduct, Justice White argued that the line between regulating
conduct and regulating free speech should be drawn where the advice is
personalized to a particular set of facts. 274 “These ideas help to locate the point
where regulation of a profession leaves off and prohibitions on speech
begin.” 275 When an individual exercises judgment with respect to the specific
facts and circumstances of a particular client, that person “is properly viewed
as engaging in the practice of a profession.” 276 Because such speech is merely
“incidental to the conduct of the profession,” the government does run afoul of
the First Amendment when it “limits the class of persons who may practice the
profession.” 277 If the “speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on
behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is directly
acquainted,” then government regulation is subject to the First Amendment.
278 He encouraged the identification of the “personal nexus between
professional and client,” and concluded that government interference of
speech outside this nexus should be considered an illegitimate regulation in
violation of the First Amendment. 279
The concurring justices also noted that they did not believe applying
the commercial speech doctrine would alter their decision because the statute
reaches fully protected speech as well; even under this doctrine, the
government could not make an adequate showing that the means used to
restrict speech were narrowly tailored. 280 Characterizing the restrictions as

270. Id. at 228‐29.
271. Id. at 229.
272. See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 541 (overturning petitioner’s contempt of court jail sentence
because the order requiring him to obtain a license before speaking publicly was declared
unconstitutional).
273. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 230.
274. Id. at 232.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232.
280. Id. at 234‐35.
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“extreme” and “drastic,” Justice White asserted that the statute, as applied to
the activities at issue, “is too blunt an instrument to survive even the reduced
level of scrutiny called for by restrictions on commercial speech.” 281
Lowe suggests that applying a state unauthorized practice statute to the
publication of generic legal information, or even “advice,” might also run afoul
of the First Amendment, and that this is true even if money exchanges hands in
return for the advice. 282 The traditional reticence about defining the practice
of law by statute or regulation could prove highly problematic. Moreover, the
line between personalized and non‐personalized advice that played such an
important part in that case would also be implicated here. It is difficult to see
whether there would be a meaningful distinction between You Can Avoid
Lawyers, with forms to facilitate that purpose, and a hypothetical How to Make
a Killing on the Stock Market. At a minimum, the likely attempt to treat on‐line
legal scriveners as engaged in "mere conduct" and not "protected speech" will
require careful analysis. It is not as apparent as some may believe that filling
out a legal form for someone else is nothing more than the "conduct" of
practicing law without a license. The fact that LegalZoom itself disclaims any
guarantee of legal accuracy may also undermine this claim. 283 In light of the
precedent outlined above, there must be great care taken in a blanket
assertion that this activity has no colorable First Amendment component.
B. Objection 2: "Even Where Conduct and Speech Are Intertwined, The State
May Still Regulate or Ban The Speech As Long As It Satisfies Intermediate
Scrutiny."
The second objection that may find some traction will likely be an
argument that even if the challenged state action reaches both protected
speech and conduct, the state's restriction will be upheld as long as it meets
the test set out by the Supreme Court in O'Brien v. United States. As Chief
Justice Warren explained in that well‐known opinion, "when speech and
nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." The
test set down by the Supreme Court in O'Brien permits such a regulation to be
upheld if "it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental

281. Id. at 235.
282. See id. at 210 (“The dangers of fraud, deception, or overreaching that motivated the
enactment of the statute are present in personalized communications but are not replicated in
publications that are advertised and sold in an open market.”); id. at 232 (White, J., concurring)
(“Where the personal nexus between professional and client does not exist, . . . government
regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation of professional practice with only incidental
impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as such, subject to the First
Amendment command that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press.’”).
283
http://www.legalzoom.com/disclaimer.html
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restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest." 284
The first two elements of the O'Brien test would appear to be easily met
by a state seeking to enforce its unauthorized practice statute against a
scrivener like LegalZoom. First, the state would assert that regulation of the
legal profession and the determination of what constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law are squarely within the State's constitutional power. "Since the
founding of the Republic," the Supreme Court has proclaimed, "the licensing
and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States . . . . [They]
prescribe the qualifications for admission to practice and the standards of
professional conduct." 285 Second, the State would argue that punishing the
preparation of legal documents by unlicensed lay scriveners would serve the
important government purpose of protecting consumers and of ensuring the
integrity of the attorney licensing system. It seems unlikely that either of
these points would engender serious debate.
More problematic for the State, however, may be the third and fourth
parts of the O'Brien test. The third prong requires that the government's
interest be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." This aspect of
the test has proven to be the downfall of other state statutes that have been
struck down under O'Brien for their lack of viewpoint neutrality, most notably
in the controversial flag‐burning case of Texas v. Johnson. 286 The question here
would be whether the state's interest in punishing the preparation of routine
legal documents by lay people was "unrelated" to the speech component of
their activity. Of course, the state would argue that its interest in consumer
protection and in ensuring that only licensed lawyers engage in law practice is
unrelated to any kind of viewpoint discrimination. But a company like
LegalZoom may well assert that the state's interest in suppressing its activities
reflects hostility to the underlying message that consumers do not need to pay
lawyers such high fees for routine legal documents.
The fourth part of the O'Brien test could provide an even greater hurdle
for a state regulator. This final part of the test requires that the "incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest." Whether this part of the test
imposes a "narrowly tailored" requirement or some lesser test is immaterial to
the larger question, which is whether the typical state unauthorized practice
statute could ever be sustained under this inquiry.
It is here that the legal profession's persistent refusal to reach consensus
on the definition of the "practice of law" could have serious practical
consequences. Sustaining a claim that an unauthorized practice statute
restricts free speech no more than what is essential to the furtherance of an
important state interest will be quite difficult if that statute does not clearly
define what precisely constitutes the practice of law. The need for a carefully
drawn statute is apparent in light of the foregoing discussion of the many First

284

391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S.438, 442 (1979)
286
491 U.S. 397 (1989)
285
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Amendment interests implicated when nonlawyers speak about the law. It is
by no means obvious that a state will be able to sustain a successful
prosecution of an online legal document preparer by relying on a standardless
unauthorized practice statute. "I know it when I see it" is no longer the
standard for determining First Amendment protection for allegedly obscene
materials 287 (if it ever was) and it is unlikely to provide safe harbor for a First
Amendment challenge to unauthorized practice statutes if the issue is ever
joined.
C. Objection 3: “Selling a Completed Legal Form Without a Law License Is
Fraudulent Commercial Speech.”
The last argument to keep in mind as these legal issues unfold is the
contention that when a book is sold in conjunction with blank legal forms, and
the book purports to “advise” others on how to achieve particular legal
objectives with these forms, the entire work is “commercial speech.” 288 Once
the work has been categorized as commercial speech, if the government can
show that the speech is “false or misleading”—that is, that the legal forms will
not achieve the desired objectives—then it may be suppressed entirely. 289 This
is the same rationale used by the federal government to suppress the sale of
the materials at issue in Schiff. 290
What are the contours of commercial speech? As previously noted, the
traditional definition of commercial speech is speech that “propose[s] a
commercial transaction.” 291 A broader interpretation appears in Central
Hudson, which defines commercial speech as “related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.” 292 But determining whether
particular speech constitutes commercial speech may be difficult. 293 A number
of hurdles would have to be overcome before a bar regulator could confidently
rely on a commercial speech defense to shut down online scrivener activities.
First, the sale of legal forms that had been completed by the scrivener at
the direction of a purchaser would have to qualify as "commercial speech." By

287

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); Lanctot, Scriveners, at
812..
288. See Schiff, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1277‐79 (discussing permissible government regulation of
commercial speech).
289. See id. (discussing regulation of commercial speech).
290. See Schiff, 379 F.3d at 630 (finding that the District Court for the District of Nevada was
acting within its discretion when it enjoined The Federal Mafia as fraudulent commercial speech).
291. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 422 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 66 (1983)) (describing the “core notion” of commercial speech); see Fox, 492 U.S. at 482
(“[T]hey do not consist of speech that proposes a commercial transaction, which is what defines
commercial speech.” (citation omitted)); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762
(considering “whether speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction’” lacks
constitutional protection (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973))).
292. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
293. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 81 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Even if it may not intend to do
so, the Court’s opinion creates the impression that ‘commercial speech’ is a fairly definite category
of communication . . . . That impression may not be wholly warranted.”).
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way of analogy, it seems highly unlikely that a court would hold that similar
activity by a licensed attorney would constitute commercial speech. One
might respond that the difference is that the attorney is "practicing law" when
he or she completes the form, but the scrivener is simply selling a commercial
product. But assuming that the question of whether the form preparation
constitutes "the practice of law" remains unclear, the definitional difficulties
again become apparent. Categorizing a will prepared by an online scrivener
as "commercial speech" seems to be an unwarranted extension of that
category, and the inconsistency in the case law discussed above suggests a
need for caution at this preliminary stage.
Even if the preparation and sale of routine legal documents by online
scriveners like LegalZoom were to be analyzed under the rubric of commercial
speech, other unsettled issues would then emerge. Doubtless the state would
seek to characterize these documents as false, fraudulent, or misleading
commercial speech, which then would receive no First Amendment protection.
For many, if not most, lawyers, this proposition would appear to be self‐
evident. In their view, the offering for sale of these documents by nonlawyers
is designed to induce reliance by consumers on the legal validity of the
completed work. But that argument may not be as easily advanced as some
may believe.
Keep in mind that LegalZoom takes great pains to disclaim any reliance on
its documents as reflecting the application of legal principles to a set of facts.
Its disclaimer expressly provides that it is "not a law firm," and that its service
is "not a substitute for the advice of an attorney, further noting: "LegalZoom is
not permitted to engage in the practice of law. LegalZoom is prohibited from
providing any kind of advice, explanation, opinion, or recommendation to a
consumer about possible legal rights, remedies, defenses, options, selection of
forms or strategies." LegalZoom states further that: "At no time do we review
your answers for legal sufficiency, draw legal conclusions, provide legal advice
or apply the law to the facts of your particular situation." 294
Disclaimers may not necessarily provide a shield against consumers who
claim to have been defrauded or misled. As I have argued elsewhere, lawyers
themselves must beware of relying too heavily on website disclaimers as a
mechanism for avoiding potential liability for providing specific legal advice
online. 295 I do not take a position as to whether the LegalZoom disclaimer, or
others like it, would suffice to undermine a claim that all legal documents
generated for consumers by nonlawyers are presumptively false, fraudulent,
or misleading. Instead, I simply sound the warning note. A blanket assertion
that all work product performed by these online scriveners is excluded from
constitutional protection as false or fraudulent commercial speech may not
automatically succeed.
Assuming that the state would argue in the alternative that its regulation
of the sale of completed legal forms could be sustained under the traditional
Central Hudson test, still more constitutional questions linger. Like the O'Brien
294
295

http://www.legalzoom.com/disclaimer.html
Lanctot, 49 Duke L.J. at 186-96.
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test discussed previously, the Central Hudson analysis also examines "whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial." Moreover, the Central
Hudson analysis focuses similarly on "whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." 296 As in the O'Brien
analysis, the state again would be forced to rely on its unauthorized practice
statute, which typically would not define with specificity what constitutes the
practice of law, to argue that its regulation "directly advances" the protection
of consumers from unlicensed lay practitioners and is not drawn more broadly
than necessary.
Even though commercial speech doctrine may appear to be a viable way
to counter free speech claims by online scriveners like LegalZoom, the
likelihood of success remains uncertain at best. Commercial speech doctrine
might successfully be used to regulate the marketing and advertising of these
services to consumers, by requiring more prominent disclaimers or by limiting
the claims made with respect to the benefit of bypassing legal assistance. But
extending that doctrine to the underlying documents themselves has potential
weaknesses that should not be ignored.
CONCLUSION
The challenge to the legal profession posed by LegalZoom and other online
scriveners may be a more knotty problem than many lawyers seem to appreciate.
As we have seen, the bar’s long-standing failure to reach consensus on what
constitutes the practice of law may have consequences in unanticipated ways. First
is the unresolved question over whether the completion of routine legal forms for
consumers while disclaiming any responsibility for their accuracy constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law. The absence of a clear definition of “practice of law”
provides at least some refuge for legal scriveners.
Second, and perhaps of greater concern, the vagueness and ambiguity inherent
in the definition of unauthorized practice may have unintended consequences if a
legal scrivener like LegalZoom presses a First Amendment defense. The legal
profession has deliberately left itself free to define a host of activities as
“unauthorized practice” on an as-needed basis. This flexibility may have served
the bar’s regulatory needs in the past, but it could prove fatal to enforcing
unauthorized practice laws in the face of a serious First Amendment challenge.
The broad and standardless definition of “practice of law” could then collide with
the requirement of specificity and narrow tailoring that underlies many aspects of
relevant First Amendment doctrine. Whether or not these First Amendment
arguments may succeed ultimately in the courts is less important than the fact that
they have a sufficient basis to complicate any action for unauthorized practice.
At bottom, the policy question about what the organized bar should do about
LegalZoom and its colleagues simply cannot be decided in a vacuum. Confronting
these online scriveners through the mechanism of unauthorized practice actions
could have serious regulatory repercussions. The moral certainty many lawyers

296

Cited supra.

Season 200N]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

141

possess that these companies are practicing law without a license is not a sufficient
basis for triggering litigation against them that could boomerang.
For too long, the legal profession has been able to avoid engaging in the
difficult process of defining, once and for all, what constitutes the practice of law.
It may not be able to sustain that approach much longer. The organized bar may
believe that it can easily stamp out the threat posed by LegalZoom and others. It
must be cautious that it not bring the day of reckoning upon itself instead.

